1. Introduction {#sec0001}
===============

What is the link between sovereign credit rating changes and financial crisis? Did the downgrading of European sovereign debt after the 2008 crisis amplify the market stress?

Tackling with rating agencies' influence on sovereign credit markets put in light two questions. The first one is: is there any information transmission when a rating agency discloses its new ratings during a period of financial crisis? The second point is: in case there is an information transmission, can a downgrading or a negative credit watch be considered as good news for the market? We investigate these questions by looking at the evolution of Sovereign CDS spread and realized CDS volatility of European countries around sovereign rating announcements.

The focus on the reaction of sovereign CDS markets to rating changes helps us to contribute to the literature on the factors affecting the sovereign default risk. Additionally, our research question helps to understand whether rating announcements increase the uncertainty and pressure on the European debt market. In the recent time of market stress associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, this issue can be of particular interest for market practitioners and policy makers.

Our sovereign CDS data consists of intraday price quotes between 2008 and 2013 provided by CMA (Credit Market Analysis Ltd.). When the announcement is not anticipated, that is when the CDS premium does not move significantly before the announcement\'s release, we find strong evidence that the release transmits information to the market. However, even if the downgrading is preceded by a move in spreads which anticipates the change in credit quality, its release may still play a role. The announcement may help to stabilize the market and reduce the uncertainty about the market price. We test this hypothesis looking at the evolution of volatility around the release. A decrease in volatility would suggest a convergence of investors' beliefs. Alternatively, an increase in volatility would imply a higher disagreement on the fair CDS price among investors, which can come from an unexpected change in credit quality.

In our study, we find that the effects of the announcements concerning investment grade (IG) countries differ from the effects observed for non-investment grade countries. We show that the downgrading and negative credit watch announcements of IG countries trigger a decrease in the spread volatility. This suggests that for IG countries, rating agencies help to stabilize the CDS market. On the opposite, the downgrading of a non-investment grade country triggers a pronounced increase in the spread volatility and the spread level, thus worsening the market stability in times of stress. This result adds evidence to previous papers dealing with the destabilizing role of sovereign ratings (for example, [@bib0008]).

We also test whether the German CDS market is influenced by negative rating changes of other European countries. We find confirmation that the downgrade of a European country\'s sovereign rating generates spillover effects on the German market.

This article relates to the literature on the effects of rating actions on credit market. Most of these studies show that bond market is often able to anticipate the downgrading action. Studies about the CDS market are not so numerous but go in the same direction. For example, [@bib0011] find that the reviews for downgrades have an important effect on the US CDS spreads and are anticipated by investors. Similarly, [@bib0018] show that the CDS market anticipates both downgrades and reviews for downgrades. Focusing on 22 emerging markets over the period 2001--2009, [@bib0012] show that CDS spreads anticipate negative sovereign rating actions. Our results highlight that, although anticipated, rating changes can play a role in the market.

This article is also related to studies on the contamination effects of sovereign ratings changes among countries (see, e.g., [@bib0002] and [@bib0007]). [@bib0004] analyze the effect of sovereign rating changes (and their spillover effects) on the euro area CDS market during the financial crisis. This work is closely related to our paper. However, the authors do not focus on the impact of these events on the CDS volatility. To the best of our knowledge, the relation between European sovereign credit ratings and sovereign CDS volatility that we investigate has not yet been studied.

Lastly, this paper contributes to the vast literature on sovereign CDS spreads in Europe and cross-market linkages during the European sovereign debt crisis (see, among others, [@bib0017], [@bib0013], [@bib0019]).

The paper proceeds as follows. Next section will present the data set and the statistical methodology, [Section 3](#sec0006){ref-type="sec"} the results and [Section 4](#sec0010){ref-type="sec"} the conclusion of the paper.

2. Data and methodology {#sec0002}
=======================

2.1. Data {#sec0003}
---------

Our sovereign CDS data consists of intraday price quotes provided by CMA (Credit Market Analysis Ltd.) Datavision, which is found to be one of the more reliable CDS data sources by [@bib0016]. CMA gathers information on CDS prices from the largest and most active credit investors. CMA applies a time and liquidity weighted aggregation so that each reported price is based on the most recent and liquid quotes.

We use 5-year USD-denominated sovereign CDS quotes for the ten countries in our sample. 5-year CDS is the most liquid segment. We use 60-minute time interval, which means we use the quotes reported for CDS within each hour interval. This time interval gives us a satisfactory trade-off between data frequency and missing observations.

While previous studies mainly estimate the effect of news on volatility using GARCH family models (e.g., [@bib0003]), the availability of high-frequency CDS data allows us to employ a simple, non-parametric, measure of volatility: We compute CDS daily realized volatility by squaring and adding 60-minute mid-quote returns.

We cover EU countries in the European monetary union, for which CDS data are available and at least one rating announcement between 2008 and 2013 occurs. We use Thomson Reuters to collect rating announcements by Standard & Poor\'s, Moody\'s and Fitch. Announcements collected consist of downgrades, negative credit watch and outlook. We do not analyze separately credit watches and outlooks; For brevity, hereafter, we refer to both these events as "negative reviews". We consider only uncontaminated credit rating announcements which means announcements which are not followed by a new rating event in the next 15 days.[1](#cit_1){ref-type="fn"} We start with 150 announcements and after imposing the filters, the final baseline sample of uncontaminated announcements consists of 97 announcements: 56 downgrades and 41 negative reviews. Precisely, the number of rating changes per country is the following :[2](#cit_2){ref-type="fn"} Austria [(3)](#eqn0003){ref-type="disp-formula"}, Belgium (5), France (7), Greece (13), Ireland (17), Italy (12), Netherland (6), Portugal (17), Spain (17). 11 downgrades involve countries for which the sovereign rating is at the speculative grade level[3](#cit_3){ref-type="fn"} after the announcement.

2.2. Variable definitions {#sec0004}
-------------------------

Several empirical analyses show that an international risk factor is the main driver of the euro area sovereign spreads ([@bib0006]; [@bib0010]). This factor is often proxied by the US stock market implied volatility (VIX), which gives a model-free option implied estimate of the volatility of the S&P500 (see e.g. [@bib0015]). [@bib0009] documents that between 2008 and 2012 the VIX contributes to European sovereign CDS variance by approximately 31%.

We compute the evolution of CDS spread and realized volatility around rating announcements, neutralizing the effect of this international risk factor. The VIX index allows us to control for changes in risk premium over time. One should note that the use of a risk factor for the euro area (implied volatility of Euro STOXX 50) leaves results unchanged.

We thus compute CDS spread changes as follows:$$Adjusted\mspace{6mu} CDS\mspace{6mu} spread = \left( {\Delta{\text{CDS}\mspace{6mu}\text{spread}\mspace{6mu}} - \mspace{6mu}\Delta\text{VIX}} \right)$$

The daily CDS spreads we use for the computation is the last CDS mid-quote of the day reported by CMA. We use the end-of-day level of VIX index collected from Bloomberg.

We then study the change in volatility around the rating news looking at the evolution of the difference between the realized volatility and the VIX index (see [@bib0005]):$$Adjusted\mspace{6mu} Volatility = \left( {\text{Realized}\,\text{volatility} - \text{VIX}} \right)$$

The computation of CDS volatility is thus based on intraday CDS mid-quote. The realized variance (RV) is defined as the sum of all available intraday high frequency squared returns given by$$RV_{t} = \sum\limits_{i = 1}^{m}\left\lbrack {p_{t,i} - \mspace{6mu} p_{t,\mspace{6mu} i - 1}} \right\rbrack^{2}$$where p is the intraday log mid-quote of the CDS for day t and m denotes the number of intraday returns to be summed. We observe for each day and each country 11 intraday CDS mid-quotes. The number of intraday mid-quotes reported by CMA are stable among country. As demonstrated in the literature (see, e.g., [@bib0001]), this "model-free" realized variance measure based on intraday data can provide much more accurate estimation than those based on daily data.

2.3. Statistical methodology {#sec0005}
----------------------------

We want to analyze the evolution of CDS spreads and realized volatility around rating announcements during the financial crisis. We define the minimal pre-announcement window as the fifteen trading days after the previous announcement up to the day of the current announcement. When the previous announcement happens more than 120 trading days prior, we set the pre-announcement window to be 120 trading days prior to the announcement, that is (−120, −1) where 0 is the announcement day. We set the post-announcement window to be 10 trading days after the release: (0, +10) .[4](#cit_4){ref-type="fn"}

We split the pre-announcement window (−120, −1), in one observation window:(1)Observation window: (−120, −11)

and two anticipation windows:(2)First anticipation window: (−10, −6)(3)Second anticipation window: (−5, −1).

We compute the evolution of CDS spreads and volatility as the average daily indicators in each window (i) minus both the average daily indicators in the previous window (i-1) and the average indicators in the observation window [(1)](#eqn0001){ref-type="disp-formula"}. We start by analyzing the change in spreads between the anticipation windows and the observation window. A statistically significant change would suggest that the new rating is anticipated by the CDS market.

Next, we observe the effect of the rating release. We split the post announcement window (+1, +10), in two windows as follows:(1)Event window: (0, +5)(2)Post event window (+6, +10)

For each variable, we compute the change between the event window (0, +5) and the second anticipation window (−1, −5) and the change between the post event window (+6, +10) and the event window (0, +5). This change signals whether the announcement disseminates any information about the issuer credit risk. Thus, after the release, we could observe a change in CDS premium and a decrease in volatility, suggesting a price stabilization.

Finally, we also investigate whether, after the announcement, our variables go back to their original level, which is their level in the observation windows. To observe this effect, we look at the difference between the post announcement window and the observation window.

3. Empirical results {#sec0006}
====================

We study separately announcements regarding investment grade and non-investment grade countries.

3.1. Sovereign investment grade CDS spread and volatility after a rating announcement {#sec0007}
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[Table 1](#tbl0001){ref-type="table"} summarizes the evolution of the CDS spread and volatility around downgrades of investment grade EU countries.Table 1**Abnormal Changes in CDS Spread and Realized CDS Volatility around Downgrades of Investment Grade Countries.**Adj. CDS Spread is the adjusted CDS spread computed as the difference between the CDS spread and the level of the VIX index. Volatility is the difference between the CDS realized volatility and the VIX index. We report the mean of all variables in each window (column mean). In the line corresponding to Window *K* = 1, we report the value for the observation window (−120, −10); in the one corresponding to Window *K* = 4, the value for the event window (0, 5) where 0 is the announcement day. We report the evolution of the variables by computing in each window their changes with both the prior window (see column window(k) - window (k-1)) and the observation window (see column window (k) - window (1)). \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicates a p-value below 1%, 5% and 10% for the *t*-test of the null hypothesis that the average change is zero.Table 1Table 1 AMeanEvolutionwindow (K)window (K)-window [(1)](#eqn0001){ref-type="disp-formula"}Window(K)-window(K-1)Adj. CDS Spread(−120, −11)−0.101Adj. CDS Spread(−10, −6)0.1120.21\*\*\*0.21\*\*\*Adj. CDS Spread(−5, −1)0.3230.42\*\*\*0.20\*\*Adj. CDS Spread(0,5)0.3940.49\*\*\*0.07Adj. CDS Spread(6,10)0.4450.53\*\*\*0.05Table 1 BMeanEvolutionwindow (K)window (K)-window [(1)](#eqn0001){ref-type="disp-formula"}Window(K)-window(K-1)Volatility(−120, −11)19.021Volatility(−10, −6)15.252−3.77\*\*−3.77\*\*Volatility(−5, −1)21.6332.616.38\*\*\*Volatility(0,5)17.034−1.99−4.59\*\*\*Volatility(6,10)16.325−2.70−0.7

The CDS spread increases significantly in the two weeks before the event. This increase in mid-quote CDS prices suggests that investors anticipate the rating announcement as they start to sell protection at a higher premium. After the downgrading announcement, the CDS spread still has a higher level compared to the one in the observation window but it does not further increase as shown by the insignificant change between the window (−5, −1) and the window (0, 5). Similar conclusions stem from the study of CDS volatility in [table 1](#tbl0001){ref-type="table"}B. One week before the announcement, CDS volatility sharply increases compared to VIX: during this anticipation period, the investors' points of view diverged, triggering higher volatility. After the announcement, CDS volatility, compared to the VIX index, decreases.

We can sum up our first result by saying that before the announcement, spread increases just as spread volatility, and after the announcement spread stabilizes as volatility decreases. So, it seems that the credit quality deterioration is anticipated by investors but the final effect of this information release is the stabilization of spreads and the drop in volatility.

In [Table 2](#tbl0002){ref-type="table"} we show the effect of a negative review announcement on CDS spread and volatility.Table 2**Abnormal Changes in CDS Spread and Volatility around Negative Reviews Announcements of Investment Grade Countries.** Adj. CDS Spread is the adjusted CDS spread computed as the difference between the spread and the level of the VIX index. Volatility is the difference between the CDS realized volatility and the VIX index. We report the mean of all variables in each window (column Mean). In the line corresponding to Window *K* = 1, we report the value for the observation window (−120, −10); in the one corresponding to Window *K* = 4, the value for the event window (0,5) where 0 is the rating announcement day. We report the evolution of the variables by computing in each windows their changes with both the prior window (see column window(k) - window (k-1)) and the observation window (see column window (k) - window [(1)](#eqn0001){ref-type="disp-formula"}). \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicates a p-value below 1%, 5% and 10% for the *t*-test of the null hypothesis that the average change is zero.Table 2Table 2 AMeanEvolutionwindow (K)window (K)-window [(1)](#eqn0001){ref-type="disp-formula"}Window(K)-window(K-1)Adj. CDS Spread(−120, −11)0.031Adj. CDS Spread(−10, −6)0.1720.140.14Adj. CDS Spread(−5, −1)0.2830.25\*\*\*0.12Adj. CDS Spread(0,5)0.4640.42\*\*\*0.17Adj. CDS Spread(6,10)0.3950.35\*\*\*−0.07Table 2 BMeanEvolutionwindow (K)(Window (K)-window [(1)](#eqn0001){ref-type="disp-formula"}Window(K)-window(K-1)Volatility(−120, −11)17.021Volatility(−10, −6)17.0320.010.01Volatility(−5, −1)21.7734.74\*\*\*4.73\*\*Volatility(0,5)20.7043.68\*\*−1.06\*\*Volatility(6,10)15.795−1.24−4.91\*\*

We find that negative reviews and downgrades announcements trigger similar results. Indeed, before the announcement of negative reviews, spread increases in a significant way one week before the event as spread volatility increases too. After the event, we observe a drop in volatility. Interestingly, while after a downgrade we immediately observe a decrease in volatility, after negative reviews the reaction is particularly pronounced one week after. The reason could be related to the content of the announcements: When releasing a credit watch, the rating agency does not give specific information except that a downgrading could be announced in the near future. As a consequence, we observe a cautious reaction of investors: We have to wait until the second week to observe a decrease in volatility.

3.2. Sovereign non-investment grade CDS spread and volatility after a rating announcement {#sec0008}
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

We now focus on rating changes of speculative grade countries. [Table 3](#tbl0003){ref-type="table"} shows the effects of downgrading on spread and volatility. Results strongly differ from the analysis of IG countries. We observe an important increase in spreads and volatility immediately after the announcement. Once again, it seems that rating agencies transmit information to the market, but this time, it has a negative impact on the market. Interestingly, looking at the CDS spread data in [table 3](#tbl0003){ref-type="table"}A, we cannot say that the downgrading is anticipated. Indeed, no significant change appeared in the CDS spread before the announcement. It seems to be an unexpected event and investors react, with the consequence of increasing spreads and volatility. The fact that the downgrade is an unexpected event for speculative sovereign issues while this is not the case of investment grade ones remains to be explored.Table 3**Abnormal Changes in CDS Spread and Volatility around Downgrades of Non-Investment Grade Countries from the Euro Area.** Adj. CDS Spread is the adjusted CDS spread computed as the difference between the spread and the level of the VIX index. Volatility is the difference between CDS realized volatility and the VIX index. We report the mean of all variables in each window (column mean). In the line corresponding to Window *K* = 1, we report the value for the observation window (−120, −10); in the one corresponding to Window *K* = 4, the value for the event window (0,5). We report the evolution of the variables by computing in each windows their changes with both the prior window (see column window(k) - window (k-1)) and the observation window (see column window (k) - window [(1)](#eqn0001){ref-type="disp-formula"}). \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicates a p-value below 1%, 5% and 10% for the *t*-test of the null hypothesis that the average change is zero.Table 3Table 3 AMeanEvolutionwindow (K)window (K)-window [(1)](#eqn0001){ref-type="disp-formula"}Window(K)-window(K-1)Adj. CDS Spread(−120, −11)0.131Adj. CDS Spread(−10, −6)−0.142−0.27\*\*−0.27\*\*Adj. CDS Spread(−5, −1)0.043−0.080.18Adj. CDS Spread(0,5)0.8040.67\*0.75\*Adj. CDS Spread(6,10)0.5450.41\*−0.26Table 3 BMeanEvolutionwindow (K)window (K)-window [(1)](#eqn0001){ref-type="disp-formula"}Window(K)-window(K-1)Volatility(−120, −11)11.501Volatility(−10, −6)14.2022.702.70Volatility(−5, −1)15.0133.520.81Volatility(0,5)29.01417.51\*\*\*13.40\*Volatility(6,10)26.20514.70\*\*\*−2.81

3.3. Downgrades of EU countries and the spillover effects to the german CDS market {#sec0009}
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Lastly, we test whether Germany\'s sovereign CDS premiums react to rating announcements of other European countries. We employ our sample of downgrades but we now investigate the evolution of Germany\'s sovereign CDS spread and volatility around the release. Results are in [table 4](#tbl0004){ref-type="table"} . In line with our previous result, we find again a clear difference between downgrades of IG and SG countries. For downgrades of investment grade EU countries, realized volatility of German CDS increases in the 5-day before the rating announcements and starts to decrease after the release. By contrast, for speculative grade EU countries CDS spread volatility experiences a pronounced increase after the release. In untabulated results, we find that German CDS spread follows similar evolution. This spillover effect of a sovereign rating announcement on the German CDS market has an important implication for future studies on the effects of rating events. Indeed, the effect of a rating change could be underestimated if the abnormal CDS returns of the involved sovereign issuer is computed using German CDS as a reference entity.Table 4**Abnormal Changes in German CDS Spread Volatility around Downgrades of Countries from the Euro Area.** Volatility is the difference between the German realized CDS volatility and the VIX index. We report the mean of this variable in each window (column mean). In the line corresponding to Window *K* = 1, we report the value for the observation window (−120, −10); in the one corresponding to Window *K* = 4, the value for the event window (0, 5) (see column window(k)). We report the evolution of the variables by computing in each window their changes with both the prior window (see column window(k) - window (k-1)) and the observation window (see column window (k) - window [(1)](#eqn0001){ref-type="disp-formula"}). \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicates a p-value below 1%, 5% and 10% for the *t*-test of the null hypothesis that the average change is zero.Table 4Downgrades of non-investment grade EU countriesMeanEvolutionwindow (K)window (K)-window [(1)](#eqn0001){ref-type="disp-formula"}Window(K)-window(K-1)Volatility(−120, −11)18.801Volatility(−10, −6)23.7324.93\*4.93\*Volatility(−5, −1)25.2536.451.51Volatility(0,5)27.3648.56\*\*\*2.12Volatility(6,10)26.1657.36\*\*−1.20Downgrades of investment grade EU countriesMeanEvolutionwindow (K)window (K)-window [(1)](#eqn0001){ref-type="disp-formula"}window(K)-window(K-1)Volatility(−120, −11)19.851Volatility(−10,−6)15.462−4.38\*\*−4.38\*\*Volatility(−5,−1)22.9833.13\*\*\*7.52\*\*\*Volatility(0,5)21.4041.55−1.58Volatility(6,10)19.9250.07−1.48

4. Conclusion {#sec0010}
=============

In this paper, we focus on the evolution of CDS spread and volatility around European sovereign rating announcements. While the evolution of the CDS spread around rating changes has been the focus of several studies, the evolution of CDS volatility has received much less attention.

We show that results differ according to the credit quality of the issuer (Investment Grade versus Speculative). The rating announcement of an investment grade country is generally anticipated by the investors. But it does not mean that its release does not affect the market: the rating announcement decreases the CDS volatility, and so helps to stabilize the market.

We observe the opposite effect when looking at the release of announcements for speculative grade countries. The rating actions seem not to have been expected by investors and trigger an increase in both CDS spreads and volatility: the rating actions thus worsen the market stability in times of stress.

Lastly, we show that the German CDS spread and volatility move in case of a rating action involving another country of the Euro area.
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Results do not change if we remove also announcements which are preceded by other rating events in the previous 20-days.

Regarding the distribution by year, the majority of rating changes happens in 2010, 2011 and 2012 with respectively 20, 27 and 21 uncontaminated rating announcements.

The rating level BBB- is usually the threshold used to classify a bond with the investment grade status ("IG", which means above or equal to the rating BBB-) or speculative grade status ("SG" or junk status, which means below the rating BBB-)

Our anticipation and event windows are similar to the ones used in [@bib0002], [@bib0004] and [@bib0014] which also investigate the effects of ratings changes on the market price.

Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at [doi:10.1016/j.frl.2020.101663](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2020.101663){#interref0001}.
